Delores E. Gren v. Preston L. Norton and M. Norton : Brief of Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1949
Delores E. Gren v. Preston L. Norton and M.
Norton : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Skeen, Thurman and Worsley; Attorneys for Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Gren v. Norton, No. 7341 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1114
r) /=========73=4=1======== Case No. 7341 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DELORES E. GREN, Individually 
and as Guardi·an Ad Litem of Gor-
don V. Gren, Geraldine Gren, and 
Vivian Gren, Minor Children of 
Melvin V. Gren, Deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
PRESTON L. NORTON and ~, Jf L P. D 
NORTON, l{ Jl ~ _
1 
_ 
Defendants and Appellants. 'J ' '~ n 
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Officer J anws Lansing·, called by defendants, testi-
fied that he saw the deceased the n1orning of the accident 
at the Liberty Cafe in Provo (Tr. 145), and that there 
was an odor of_whiskey on his breath (Tr. 146), and ,that 
from his speech ( Tr. 147), and general manner of hand-
ling himself he knew that deceased had been drinking. 
This action was commenced by plain tiff Delores E. 
Gren, surviving wife, in behalf of herself and surviving 
minor children, Gordon V. Gren, Geraldine Gren and 
Vivian Gren. The first trial of the action commenced 
on X ovember 10, 1947, and the jury returned a verdict 
of no cause of action on November 15, 1947. Thereafter, 
the court granted a new trial. The second trial com-
menced on December 8, 1948, and on December 14, 1948, 
~he jury returned a verdict in favor of .plaintiffs, award-
ing funeral and burial expenses of $558.50, and general 
damages of $8,000.00. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
Appellants rely upon the following errors: 
Error No. 1 
The trial court erred in denying defendants' Mo-
tion for a Directed Verdict ( Tr. 236) . 
Error No.2 
The trial court erred in denying defendants' Motion 
for a Non-suit (Tr. 115). 
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Error No.3 
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 5, to 
which the defendan,ts excepted (Tr. 265). 
Error No.4 
The trial court erred in giving paragraph 2 of In-
struction No. 5, to which the defendants excepted (Tr. 
265). 
Error No.5 
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 6, to 
which the defendants excepted ( Tr. 265). 
Error No.6 
The trial court erred in giving paragraph 3 of In-
struction No. 6, to which defendants excepted (Tr. 266). 
Error No.7 
The trial court erred in giving instruction No. 8, to 
which defendants excepted (Tr. 266). 
Error No.8 
The trial court erred in giving paragraph 3 of In-
struction No. 8, to which defendants excepted (Tr. 266). 
Error No.9 
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 17, 
to which the defendants excepted (Tr. 266). 
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Error No. 10 
The trial court erred in giving the following por-
tion of Instruction No. 17, to "·hich defendants ex·cepted 
(Tr. 267). 
''This presumption is not conclusive, but is a 
matter to be considered by the jury, in connection 
· with all the other facts and circumstances in the 
case, in determining whether or not the deceased 
Melvin V. Gren was guilty of contributory negli-
gence at the time of the accident.'' 
Error No. 11 
The trial court erred in giving the following portion 
of Instruction No. 19, to which defendants excepted {Tr. 
268). 
"Further, if you should find the issues in 
favor of the plaintiffs, you may assess as dam-
ages, the cost of funeral and burial expense, 
which said sum shall not be in excess of $558.50. '' 
Error No. 12 
The trial court erred in giving· the following portion 
of Instruction No. 21, to which defendants excepted (Tr. 
b· 268). 
"That the intersection of 5th West Street and 
12th North, where the accident occurred, consti-
tutes a single intersection even though 5th West 
at that point has neutral zones separating oppos-
ing traffic lanes. '' 
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Error No. 13 
The trial ·court erred in giving Instruction No. 23, 
to which the defendants excepted (Tr. 268). 
Error No. 14 
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 25, 
to which the defendants excepted (Tr. 268). 
Error No. 15 
The trial court erred in giving paragraph 3 of In-
struction No. 25, to which the defendants excepted (Tr. 
268). 
Error No. 16. 
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the 
jury in accordance with defendants' requesrt for Instruc-
tion No. 5, to which refusal defendants excepted (Tr. 
269). 
Error No. 17 
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the 
jury in accordance with defendants' request for Instruc-
tion No. 7, to which refusal defendants exceprted (Tr. 
269). 
Error No. 18 
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the 
jury in accordance with defendants' request for Instruc-
]U 
tir 
~; 
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tion No. 13, to which refusal defendants excepted (Tr. 
269). 
Error No. 19 
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the 
jury in accordance with defendants' request for Instruc-
tion No. 14, to which refusal defendants excepted (Tr. 
270). 
Error ~o. 20 
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury 
in accordance with defendants' request for Instruction 
No. 15, to which refusal defendants excepted (Tr. 270). 
ARGUMENT 
Error No. 1 
This error is directed to the order of the trial court, 
overruling defendants' motion for a directed verdict. 
The grounds of the motion were as follows (Tr. 110, 
234): 
1. That the plaintiffs' complaint fails to 
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of ac-
ticTt against the defendants, or either of them. 
2. That there is a total want of evidence to 
establish that the defendants, or either of them, 
was guilty of any act of negligence alleged in the 
complaint which proximately caused, or contribu-
ted to the collision between the defendant's truck 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
and trailer and the deceased's autom·obile, result .... 
ing in the death of the deceased. 
3. That there is a total want of evidence to 
establish the defendants or either of them was 
guilty of any act of negligence set forth in the 
complaint. 
4. That the evidence shows without a dis-
pute that the deceased himself was guilty of 
negligence as a matter of law, in that while enter-
ing and crossing said intersection the deceased, 
carelessly and negligently failed to kee'P a propPi' 
or any look out for vehicles travelling south upon 
the west side of 5th West street in Provo ap-
proaching the intersection of said street with 12th 
North street, on which street the deceased was 
travelling in a westerly direction; and that said 
negligence and failure of the deceased proxi-
mately contributed to the collision involved in 
this case, resulting in the death of the deceased. 
5. That the evidence shows without dispute 
that the deceased was guilty of negligence, as a 
matter of law, in that while entering and crossing 
said intersection, he carelessly and negligently 
failed to keep a 'proper or any look out for vehicles 
travelling south upon the west side of 5th West 
street in Provo, Utah, approaching said inter-
seC'tion of said street with 12th North street, on 
which street the deceased was travelling in a 
westerly direction, in sufficient time to avoid the 
collision involved in this action, and that said 
negligence and failure proximately contributed, 
as a matter of law, to the said collision. 
6. That the evidence shows without dispute 
tha:t when the deceased reached the island and 
was in the act of entering that portion of the 
highw'ay at 5th West street, reserved for south 
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bound traffic on the said street, the defendant 
Preston ~ orton was approximately 100 feet 
north of the intersection, and began sounding his 
horn and applying his brakes ; 
.. Also that the evidence shows without dispute 
that the deceased, in passing from the east side 
of 5th "~est street, to the island, and thence over 
the west side of 5th West street, carelessly and 
negligently failed to keep a proper or any look 
out for vehicles travelling south on 5th West 
street, until he reached the point near the west 
edge of the concrete on 5th \Y est street, and in 
the \Yest lane of the two lanes on said street re-
served for south bound traffic; and that by reason 
of said failure the deceased was negligent, ·as a 
matter of law, and that said negligence proxi-
mately contributed to the collision and resulting 
death of the deceased. 
7. That the evidence in this case shows with-
out dispute that 5th West street in Provo, Utah, 
was a through highway, and that the deceased, 
as a matter of law, was required, in addition to 
bringing his automobile to a stop at the entrance 
thereof, prior to entering on said highway, to 
yield the right of way to other vehicles which 
were approaching so close on said through high-
way ·as to constitute an immediate hazard; 
That the evidence also shows without dispute 
that the deceased entered and ~proceeded through 
said through highway at a time when the defend-
ants' truck was approaching the intersection be-
tween 5th West street and 12th North street, 
Provo, Utah, and was so close thereto as to con-
stitute an immediate hazard; and that the evi-
dence also shows without dispute that the de-
ceased failed to yield the right of way to defend-
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ants' truck, and that by reason of said failure, 
the deceased was negligent, as a matter of law, 
and that said negligence proximately contributed 
to the collision involved in this case and resulting 
death of the deceased. 
8. That the evidence shows, without dispute, 
that at no time, after leaving the stop sign and 
while traversing the said intersection, did the 
deceased exercise the degree ·of care required of 
one in driving an automobile through an inter-
section, in this : That the deceased carelessly anJ 
negligently failed to keep a proper lookout, or 
any lookout at all while traversing the intersec-
tion ; and that by reason of such failure the de-
ceased, as a matter of law, \Yas negligent and 
that said negligence proximately contributed to 
the collision and the deceased's resulting death. 
9. That the evidence shows without dispute, 
that at no time, after leaving the stop sign and 
while traversing the said intersection, did the 
deceased exercise that degree of care required of 
one driving an automobile through an intersec-
tion in this : That the deceased upon reaching a 
point at or near the south side of the first island 
in said U. S. Highway 91 located north of the in-
tersection, at a time when the defendants' truck 
travelling south was approaching so close to de-
ceased's lane of travel, as to constitute an imme-
diate hazard; and carelessly and negligently 
failed to stop his automobile at or near said place 
and allow the defendant's truck to enter the in-
tersection, and proceed through there; and that 
by reason of such failure, the deceased, as a 
matter of law, was negligent and that such negli-
gence proximately contributed to the collision and 
the deceased's resulting death. 
•j ~' I 
li1 
mer 
r:.e 
ill~ t 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
Officer James Lansing, called by defendants, testi-
fied that he ~aw the deceased the n1orning of the accident 
at the Liberty Cafe in Provo (Tr. 145), and that there 
was an odor of whiskey on his breath (Tr. 146}, and ,that 
from his speech (Tr. 147), and general manner of hand-
ling himself he knew that deceased had been drinking. 
This action was commenced by plain tiff Delores E. 
Gren, surviving wife, in behalf of herself and surviving 
minor children, Gordon V. Gren, Geraldine Gren and 
Vivian Gren. The first trial of the action commenced 
on November 10, 1947, and the jury returned a verdict 
of no cause of action on November 15, 1947. Thereafter, 
the court granted a new trial. The second trial com-
menced on December 8, 1948, and on December 14, 1948, 
~he jury returned a verdict in favor of .plaintiffs, award-
ing funeral and burial expenses of $558.50, and general 
damages of $8,000.00. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
Appellants rely upon the following errors: 
Error No. 1 
The trial court erred in denying defendants' Mo-
tion for a Directed Verdict (Tr. 236). 
Error No. 2 
The trial court erred in denying defendants' Motion 
for a Non-suit (Tr. 115). 
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Error No.3 
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 5, to 
which the defendan,ts excepted (Tr. 265). ~on 
Error No.4 
The trial court erred in giving paragraph 2 of In-
struction No. 5, to which the defendants excepted (Tr. 
265). 
Error No.5 
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 6, to 
which the defendants excepted (Tr. 265). 
Error No.6 
The trial court erred in giving paragraph 3 of In-
struction No. 6, to which defendants excepted (Tr. 266). 
Error No.7 
The trial court erred in giving instruction No. 8, to 
which defendants exce:pted (Tr. 266). 
Error No.8 
The trial court erred in giving paragraph 3 of In-
struction No. 8, to which defendants excepted (Tr. 266). 
Error No.9 
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 17, 
to which the defendants excepted (Tr. 266). 
iJ1 
ill 
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Error No. 10 
The trial court erred in giving the following por-
tion of Instruction No. 17, to which defendants ex·cepted 
(Tr. 267). 
''This presumption is not conclusive, but is a 
matter to be considered by the jury, in connection 
with all the other facts and circumstances in ·the 
case, in determining whether or not the deceased 
Melvin V. Gren was guilty of contributory negli-
gence at the time of the accident.'' 
Error No. 11 
The trial court erred in giving the following portion 
of Instruction No. 19, to which defendants excepted (Tr. 
268). 
"Further, if you should find the issues in 
favor of the plaintiffs, you may assess as dam-
ages, the cost of funeral and burial expense, 
which said sum shall not be in excess of $558.50. '' 
Error No. 12 
The trial court erred in giving the following portion 
of Instruction No. 21, to which defendants excepted (Tr. 
268). 
"That the intersection of 5th West Street and 
12th North, where the accident occurred, consti-
tutes a single intersection even though 5th West 
at that point has neutral zones separating oppos-
ing traffic lanes.'' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
Error No. 13 
The trial eourt erred in giving Instruction No. 23, 
to which the defendants excepted (Tr. 268). 
Error No. 14 
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 25, 
to which the defendants excepted (Tr. 268). 
Error No. 15 
The trial court erred in giving paragraph 3 of In-
struction No. 25, to which the defendants excepted (Tr. 
268). 
Error No. 16 
The trial eourt erred in refusing to instruct the 
jury in accordance with defendants' request for Instruc-
tion No. 5, to which refusal defendants excepted (Tr. 
269). 
Error No. 17 
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the 
jury in accordance with defendants' request for Instruc-
tion No. 7, to which refusal defendants exce'pited (Tr. 
269). 
Error No. 18 
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the 
jury in accordance with defendants' request for Ins true-
illi 
Th 
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tion .No. 13, to whieh refusal defendants excepted ( Tr. 
269). 
Error No. 19 
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the 
jury in accordance with defendants' request for Instruc-
tion ~o. 14, to which refusal defendants excepted (Tr. 
270). 
Error Xo. 20 
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury 
in accordance with defendants' request for ins1truction 
No. 15, to which refusal defendants excepted (Tr. 270). 
ARGUMENT 
Error No.1 
This error is directed to the order of the trial court, 
overruling defendants' motion for a directed verdict. 
The grounds of the motion were as follows (Tr. 110, 
234): 
1. That the plaintiffs' complaint fails to 
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of ac-
tion against the defendants, or either of them. 
2. That there is a total want of evidence to 
establish that the defendants, or either of them, 
was guilty of any act of negligence alleged in the 
complaint which proximately caused, or contribu-
ted to the collision between the defendant's truck 
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and trailer and the deceased's automobile, result~ 
ing in the death of the deceased. 
3. That there is a total want of evidence to 
establish the defendants or either of them was 
guilty of any act of negligence set forth in the 
complaint. 
4. That the evidence shows without a dis-
pute that the deceased himself was guilty of 
negligence as a matter of law, in that while enter-
ing and crossing said intersection the deceased, 
carelessly and negligently failed to kee'P a proper 
or any look out for vehicles travelling south u:pon 
the west side of 5th West street in Provo ap-
proaching the intersection of said street with 12th 
North street, on which street the deceased was 
travelling in a westerly direction; and that said 
negligence and failure of the deceased proxi-
mately contributed . to the collision involved in 
this case, resulting in the death of the deceased. 
5. That the evidence shows without dispute 
that the deceased was guilty of negligence, as a 
matter of law, in that while entering and crossing 
said intersection, he carelessly and negligently 
failed to keep a 'proper or any look out for vehicles 
travelling south upon the west side of 5th West 
street in Provo, Utah, approaching said inter-
section of said street with 12th North street, on 
which street the deceased was travelling in a 
westerly direction, in sufficient time to avoid the 
collision involved in this action, and that said 
negligence and failure proximately contributed, 
as a matter of law, to the said collision. 
6. That the evidence shows without dispute 
that when the deceased reached the island and 
was in the act of entering that portion of the 
highway at 5th West street, reserved for south 
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15 
bound traffic on the said street, the defendant 
Preston Norton was approximately 100 feet 
north of the intersection, and began sounding his 
horn and applying his brakes; 
Also that the evidence shows without dispute 
that the deceased, in passing from the east side 
of 5th West street, to the island, and thence over 
the west side of 5th West street, carelessly and 
negligently failed to keep a proper or any look 
out for vehicles travelling south on 5th West 
street, until he reached the point near the west 
edge of the concrete on 5th West street, and in 
the west lane of the two lanes on said street re-
served for south bound traffic; and that by reason 
of said failure the deceased was negligent, as a 
matter of law, and that said negligence proxi-
mately contributed to the collision and resulting 
death of the deceased. 
7. That the evidence in this case shows with-
out dispute that 5th West street in Provo, Utah, 
was a through highway, and that the deceased, 
as a matter of law, was required, in addition to 
bringing his automobile to a stop at the entrance 
thereof, prior to entering on said highway, to 
yield the right of way to other vehicles which 
were approaching so close on said through high-
way ·as to constitute an immediate hazard; 
That the evidence ·also shows without dispute 
that the deceased entered and ~proceeded through 
said through highway at a time when the defend-
ants' truck was approaching the intersection be-
tween 5th West street and 12th North street, 
Provo, Utah, and was so close thereto as to con-
stitute an immediate hazard; and that the evi-
dence also shows without dispute that the de-
ceased failed to yield the right of way to defend-
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ants' truck, and that by reason of said failure, 
the deceased was negligent, as a matter of law, 
and that said negligence proximately contributed 
to the collision involved in this case and resulting 
death of the deceased. 
8. That the evidence shows, without dispute, 
that at no time, after leaving the stop sign anfl 
while traversing the said intersection, did the 
deceased exercise the degree of care required of 
one in driving an automobile through an inter-
section, in this: That the deceased carelessly aml 
negligently failed to keep a proper lookout, or 
any lookout at all while traversing the intersec-
tion; and that by reason of such failure the de-
ceased, as a matter of law, was negligent and 
that said negligence proximately contributed to 
the collision and the deceased's resulting death. 
9. That the evidence shows without dispute, 
that at no time, after leaving the stop sign and 
while traversing the said intersection, did the 
deceased exercise that degree of care required of 
one driving an automobile through an intersec-
tion in this : That the deceased upon reaching a 
point at or near the south side of the first island 
in said U. S. Highway 91 located north of the in-
tersection, at a time when the defendants' truck 
travelling south was approaching so close to de-
ceased's lane of travel, as to constitute an imme-
diate hazard; and carelessly and negligently 
failed to stop his automobile at or near said place 
and allow the defendant's truck to enter the in-
tersection, and proceed through there; and that 
by reason of such failure, the deceased, as a 
matter of law, was negligent and that such negli-
gence proximately contributed to the collision and 
the deceased's resulting death. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DELORES E. GREN, Individually 
and as Guardian Ad Litem of Gor-
don V. Gren, Geraldine Gren, and 
Vivian Gren, Minor Children of 
Melvin V. Gren, Deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
PRESTON L. NORTON and ~1. 
NORTON, 
Defendants and A:ppellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 7341 
(All italics, unless otherwise noted, are appellants'.) 
Exhibit 1, which is an enlargement of a portion of 
Exhibit A, is a diagram of the intersection area of Fifth 
West and Twelfth North in Provo, Utah, which inter-
section was the scene of the truck collision here involved. 
That diagram, as well as the oral testimony (see particu-
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larly Tr. 7 to 23), shows that Fifth West is an arterial 
highway running in a general north-south direction 
with two double lanes of traffic separated by a center 
safety or neutral zone. The ·overall width of the high-
way at the intersection area is 66.5 feet, with two north-
bound traffic lanes of 11 feet each occupying the extreme 
easterly portion, two southbound traffic lanes of 11 feet 
each occupying the extreme westerly portion, and a neu-
tral zone of 22.5 feet in the center of the highway, ex-
tending northerly from the north side of the intersection 
for about 100 feet. Some distance to the north is a 
second safety zone in the highway center, of roughly 
the same size. These zones are curbed, have rounded 
ends, and are raised from the level of the adjacent high-
way about six inches. A similar zone lies immediately 
south of the intersection. 
Twelfth North is a two-lane highway which inter-
sects Fifth West from the east at about a 90 degree 
angle. Slightly to the north of the intersection point of 
Twelfth North, an old highway intersects Fifth West 
on the west side, and extends in a northwesterly direc-
tion. At the northeast corner of the intersection is a 
stop sign controlling traffic westbound on Twelfth 
North, which is 44 feet east of the east concrete edge 
of Fifth West. A service station is also located on this 
corner, and the area between the service station and 
Twelfth North and Fifth West is flat, hard and un-
obstructed. 
To the north of the intersection, Fifth West extends 
in a very gradual northwesterly curve in a level manner 
,~nl 
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for about 2265 feet ( Tr. 13), and then rises in a gradual 
clilnb to a point about a milE' to the north, where it again 
{'untinues northward on the level. From the stop sign at 
the northeast corner the highway is in :plain sight to 
the top of the hill a mile to the north, and the same 
visibility obtains at the south edge of the center safety 
zone (Tr. 184). From the westerly traffic lanes of the 
intersection there is clear visibility along Fifth West 
at least to the Provo River bridge, which is 775 feet to 
the north. Gasoline stations are also located on the 
southeast and southwest corners of the intersection. The 
posted speed limit of Fifth West from the intersection 
north to the bridge is 40 miles per hour, and from that 
point north, 50 miles per hour. (Tr. 90.) 
On July 28, 1946, at about 4:30 P. M., defendant 
Preston ~ orton was driving a semi-trailer truck heavily 
loaded with lumber (Tr. 177), and weighing 26 tons (Tr. 
160), in a southerly direction on the westerly traffic 
lane of Fifth West, and was approaching the intersection 
of that street with Twelfth North. At the same time 
Melvin Gren, the deceased, was approaching the inter-
section from the east on Twelfth North in a 1935 Chev-
rolet sedan. He was alone in the automobile. Norton 
testified that he first saw the Gren automobile as it was 
approaching the east concrete edge of the intersection, 
and at a time when the truck was an estimated 250 feet 
north of the intersection (Tr. 182). He immediately 
checked his brakes and sounded his horn, which was a 
truck horn of greater intensity and pitch than that of 
an average automobile (Tr. 186, 200). The highway be-
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tween the truck and Gren automobile was clear of traf-
fic (Tr. 187), and remained that way to the time of 
collision. The Gren automobile continued in a straight 
westerly direction across the intersection at about 5 or 
10 miles per hour, and at a constant rate of speed, neither 
slowing nor speeding up (Tr. 188). Norton observed 
deceased as his car proceeded westerly, and deceased 
was slumped down behind the wheel of the automobile, 
looking straight ahead to the west (Tr. 188), at least 
from the point where the Norton truck was 100 feet 
from the intersection (Tr. 204), to a point about 10 feet 
prior to the collision, when for the first time deceased 
look:ed up and tried to turn his car to the left and south 
(Tr. 189). When the truck was about 100 feet north of 
the intersection, Norton realized that deceased was not 
going to stop in the area south of the safety or neutral 
zone (Tr. 187, 190, 215), and locked his brakes and put 
his horn on full blast. At the same time he started 
edging his truck to the westerly side of the highway, and 
the right wheels of the truck were actually off on the 
west gravel shoulder at the time of the impact (Tr. 203). 
The service station on the southwest corner of the inter-
section and a telephone pole on the northwest corner 
prevented his driving the truck any farther west than 
he did in an attempt to avoid the collision. Norton also 
testified that he had had a broad experience in driving 
a similar type of Chevrolet to that driven by deceased, 
and that at the speed the automobile was going prior to 
the accident it could have been stopped in not to exceed 
four feet (Tr. 192). He also testified that the Chevrolet 
\-·J 
\11!1 
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Y:n:s 15 to 18 feet long, and that there was an1ple room 
for it ·within the area of 22.5 feet south of the safety 
zone (Tr. 193). He stated that the truck, loaded as it 
was, could have been stopped in 175 to 200 feet at a 
speed of 35 miles per hour. Norton stated that at the 
tin1e his truck reached the level area to the north of 
the intersection, he was traveling about 40 miles per 
hour (Tr. 184), and that at a point just prior to impact 
he had slowed to 30 or 35 miles per hour (Tr. 210). 
Paul Adamson, a ·witness called by Plaintiff, was 
standing on the north side and in front of his car which 
was being serviced at the service station on the south-
east corner of the intersection, when he first observed 
the Gren automobile going west on 12th North about 
100 feet east of the stop sign on the northeast corner of 
the intersection. At this point the Gren automobile was 
slowly traveling in low gear with the motor occasionally 
racing (Tr. 26). The Gren automobile storpped at the 
stop sign (Tr. 26), with deceased slumped behind the 
wheel, low in the seat, and facing directly west (Tr. 31). 
Adamson did not again notice the Gren car until it 
reached the south side of the traffic or neutral zone in 
the middle of Fifth West and was entering the west 
traffic lanes, at which point his attention was called to 
the car by the words of his son who called, "Look out, 
fellow, you're going to get hit," or words to that effect. 
At this point the southbound truck was honking furi-
ously and the Gren car was traveling at a very slow 
rate of speed with its driver still slumped over the 
wheel, facing directly to the west. As the Gren car got 
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to the westerly side of the intersection, the deceased 
looked up for the first time, and then swerved his car a 
little to his left when the impact occurred (Tr. 36). As 
the truck approached the point of collision it edged to 
the west, and the right wheels of the truck were off the 
concrete portion of the highway when the impact oc-
curred. ( Tr. 38, 39.) 
Kenneth Adamson, a witness called by defendants, 
was also at the southeast corner of the intersection, and 
first noticed the Gren automobile proceeding westerly 
from the stop sign at the northeast corner of the inter-
section (Tr. 117). He observed the Gren car as it 
traversed the intersection at a very slow, constant rate 
of speed, with the driver slumped low in the seat looking 
straight to the west as this car went through the inter-
section. He stated that the impact occurred at the west 
edge of the intersection, and that when the deceased was 
about 15 feet away from the collision he looked up for 
the first and only time and tried to turn to his left, but 
did not succeed in making any appreciable change in 
course prior to impact ( Tr. 120, 121). He also stated 
that he heard the truck horn the first time when the 
truck was 250 to 300 feet north of the intersection (Tr. 
123), and that he heard the horn again prior to the 
accident (Tr. 124). The sounding of the horn had no 
effect on the deceased as he drove his automobile west-
erly through the intersection (Tr. 125, 129). 
Officer Louis J. Brandon, witness called by plain-
tiff, arrived at the scene shortly after the accident, and 
placed the impact, based upon the physical evidence, at 
~I)] 
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a point :2 feet 9 inches east of the west concrete edge of 
the highway, and a trifle north of the center line of 12th 
~ orth. He used the center line of the truck as imp8!.C t. 
point (Tr. 68). Truck tire Inarks extended from the 
im·pact area northerly for a distance of 55 feet 10 inches, 
and at the north end were 10 to 12 feet east of ~the west 
concrete edge (Tr. 73). There were two sets of tire 
marks at the north end, but the westerly line of the 
marks veered off the concrete a,t a point 40 feet south 
of the commencement point at the north (Tr. 73). After 
impact, the truck traveled 179 feet 2 inches (Tr. 67) 
along the west shoulder of the highway, where it came 
to resrt in front of a store. Deceased was apparently 
killed instantly. Driver Norton testified, however, that 
the impact severed the air lines to the brakes, and that 
he had no braking power thereafter. 
\Vitness Jack C. Bullock, called by plaintiff, rtesti-
fied that he was driving southward on Fifth West at a 
point % mile north of the intersection when the truck 
passed his automobile (Tr. 43). At that poill(t Bullock 
was traveling about 40 miles per hour, and he estimated 
the speed of the truck as it passed him to have been 
about 50 miles per hour (Tr. 44). He also testified, how-
ever, that between ,the point at which the truck passed 
him and the point of collision, the truck advanced in 
front of his automobile only a block or a block and a 
half (Tr. 47). Defendant M. Norton, however, testified 
that the truck speed was regulated by a governor, which 
in connection w~th the diesel motor speed and gears, 
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made it a physical impossibility to drive the truck faster 
than 47lj:2 m.p.h. (Tr. 158, 159). 
Witness Wesley Carter, called by plaintiff, who was 
approaching the intersection from the south, stated tha,t 
he estimated the truck \Yas going possibly 50 or 55 miles 
per hour 150 to 180 feet north of the intersection (Tr. 
51). He also tes,tified that he noticed the Gren car 
progressing slowly and steadily through the intersection, 
without stopping or changing its estimated speed of 10 
to 15 miles ·per hour (Tr. 51, 55). 
Witness Tom Bingham, called by defendants, first 
saw deceased the day of the accident in ,the early morn-
ing, when deceased came to the door of the Bingham 
home. Deceased had been drinking and was ''oiled up 
a little" (Tr. 225). He was also carrying one-half of !1 
fifth of whiskey, which he and Bingham drank between 
the time of arrival and an hour later when they went to 
the Provo River (Tr. 224). They remained at the Provo 
River, swimming and drinking (Tr. 226), un,til about 
three o'clock in the afternoon, and during this time con-
sumed an additional fifth of whiskey, more or less be-
tween them (Tr. 226). They left the Provo River and 
returned to the Bingham home, and by this time Bing-
ham himself was so intoxicated tha,t he could not be sure 
of the exact condition of the deceased in this regard ( Tr. 
226). Deceased thereafter left the Bingham home in his 
automobile. Within about one-half hour thereafter, 
Bingham called the Gren home, and was advised thfut the 
accident had occurred (Tr. 227). 
rR 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DELORES E. GREN, Individually 
and as Guardian Ad Litem of Gor-
don V. Gren, Geraldine Gren, and 
Vivian Gren, :Minor Children of 
Melvin V. Gren, Deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
PRESTON L. NORTON and ~I. 
NORTON, 
Defendants and A,ppellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 7341 
(All italics, unless otherwise noted, are appellants'.) 
Exhibit 1, which is an enlargement of a portion of 
Exhibit A, is a diagram of the intersection area of Fifth 
West and Twelfth North in Provo, Utah, which inter-
section '"as the scene of the truck collision here involved. 
That diagram, as well as the oral testimony (see particu-
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larly Tr. 7 to 23), shows that Fifth West is an arterial 
highway running in a general north-south direction 
with two double lanes of traffic separated by a center 
safety or neutral zone. The overall width of the high-
way at the intersection area is 66.5 feet, with two north-
bound traffic lanes of 11 feet each occupying the extreme 
easterly portion, two southbound traffic lanes of 11 feet 
each occupying the extreme westerly portion, and a neu-
tral zone of 22.5 feet in the center of the highway, ex-
tending northerly from the north side of the intersection 
for about 100 feet. Some distance to the north is a 
second safety zone in the highway center, of roughly 
the same size. These zones are curbed, have rounded 
ends, and are raised from the level of the adjacent high-
way about six inches. A similar zone lies immediately 
south of the intersection. 
Twelfth North is a two-lane highway which inter-
sects Fifth West from the east at about a 90 degree 
angle. Slightly to the north of the intersection point of 
Twelfth North, an old highway intersects Fifth West 
on the west side, and extends in a northwesterly direc-
tion. At the northeast corner of the intersection is a 
stop sign controlling traffic westbound on Twelfth 
North, which is 44 feet east of the east concrete edge 
of Fifth West. A service station is also located on this 
corner, and the area between the service station and 
Twelfth North and Fifth West is flat, hard and un-
obstructed. 
To the north of the intersection, Fifth West extends 
in a very gradual northwesterly curve in a level manner 
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for about 2265 feet (Tr. 13), and then rises in a gradual 
climb to a point about a mile to the north, where it again 
continues northward on the level. From the stop sign at 
the northeast corner the highway is in :plain sight to 
the top of the hill a Inile to the north, and the same 
visibility obtains at the south edge of the center safety 
zone (Tr. 184). From the westerly traffic lanes of the 
intersection there is clear visibility along Fifth West 
at least to the Provo River bridge, which is 775 feet to 
the north. Gasoline stations are also located on the 
southeast and southwest corners of the intersection. The 
posted speed limit of Fifth West from the intersection 
north to the bridge is 40 miles per hour, and from that 
point north, 50 miles per hour. (Tr. 90.) 
On July 28, 1946, at about 4:30 P. M., defendant 
Preston Norton was driving a semi-trailer truck heavily 
loaded with lumber (Tr. 177), and weighing 26 tons (Tr. 
160), in a southerly direction on the westerly traffic 
lane of Fifth West, and was approaching the intersection 
of that street with Twelfth North. At the same time 
Melvin Gren, the deceased, was approaching the inter-
section from the east on Twelfth North in a 1935 Chev-
rolet sedan. He was alone in the automobile. Norton 
testified that he first saw the Gren automobile as it was 
approaching the east concrete edge of the intersection, 
and at a time when the truck was an estimated 250 feet 
north of the intersection (Tr. 182). He immediately 
checked his brakes and sounded his horn, which was a 
truck horn of greater intef!.sity and pitch than that of 
an average automobile (Tr. 186, 200). The highway be-
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tween the truck and Gren autonwbile was clear of traf-
fic (Tr. 187), and remained that way to the time of 
collision. The Gren automobile continued in a straight 
westerly direction across the intersection at about 5 or 
10 miles per hour, and at a constant rate of speed, neither 
slowing nor speeding up (Tr. 188). Norton observed 
deceased as his car proceeded westerly, and deceased 
'"~as slumped down behind the wheel of the automobile, 
looking straight ahead to the west (Tr. 188), at least 
from the point where the Norton truck was 100 feet 
from the intersection (Tr. 204), to a point about 10 feet 
prior to the collision, when for the first time deceased 
looked up and tried to turn his car to the left and south 
(Tr. 189). When the truck was about 100 feet north of 
the intersection, Norton realized that deceased was riot 
going to stop in the area south of the safety or neutral 
zone (Tr. 187, 190, 215), and locked his brakes and put 
his horn on full blast. At the same time he started 
edging his truck to the westerly side of the highway, and 
the right wheels of the truck were actually off on the 
west gravel shoulder at the time of the impact (Tr. 203). 
The service station on the southwest corner of the inter-
section and a telephone pole on the northwest corner 
prevented his driving the truck any farther west than 
he did in an attempt to avoid the collision. Norton also 
testified that he had had a broad experience in driving 
a similar type of' Chevrolet to that driven by deceased, 
and that at the speed the automobile was going prior to 
the accident it could have been stopped in not to exceed 
four feet (Tr. 192). He also testified that the Chevrolet 
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wa8 15 to 18 feet long, and that there was mnple room 
for it ·within the area of ~:2.5 feet south of the safety 
zont> ( Tr. 193). He 8ta ted that the truck, loaded as it 
was, could have been stopped in 175 to 200 feet at a 
speed of 35 mile8 per hour. Norton stated that at the 
tin1e hi~ truck reached the level area to the north of 
the intersection, he ·was traveling about 40 miles per 
hour (Tr. 184), and that at a point just prior to impact 
he had slowed to 30 or 35 miles per hour ( Tr. 210). 
Paul Ada1nson, a "·itness called by Plaintiff, was 
standing on the north side and in front of his car which 
\Yas being serviced at the service station on the south-
east corner of the intersection, when he first observed 
the Gren automobile going west on 12th North about 
100 feet east of the stop sign on the northeast corner of 
the intersection. At this point the Gren automobile was 
slmdy traveling in low gear with the motor occasionally 
racing (Tr. 26). The Gren automobile stopped at the 
stop sign (Tr. 26), with deceased slumped behind the 
wheel, low in the seat, and facing directly west (Tr. 31). 
Adamson did not again notice the Gren car until it 
reached the south side of the traffic or neutral zone in 
the middle of Fifth West and was entering the west 
traffic lanes, at which point his attention was called to 
the car by the words of his son who called, "Look out, 
fellow, you're going to get hit," or words to that effect. 
At this point the southbound truck was honking furi-
ously and the Gren car was traveling at a very slow 
rate of speed with its driver still slumped over the 
wheel, facing directly to the west. As the Gren car got 
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to the westerly side of the intersection, the deceased 
looked up for the first time, and then swerved his car a 
little to his left when the impact occurred (Tr. 36). As 
the truck approached the point of collision it edged to 
the west, and the right wheels of the truck were off the 
concrete portion of the highway when the impact oc-
curred. ( Tr. 38, 39.) 
Kenneth Adamson, a witness called by defendants, 
was also at the southeast corner of the intersection, and 
first noticed the Gren automobile proceeding westerly 
from the stop sign at the northeast corner of the inter-
section (Tr. 117). He observed the Gren car as it 
traversed the intersection at a very slow, constant rate 
of speed, with the driver slump1ed low in the seat lookinl} 
straight to the west as this car went through the inter-
section. He stated that the impact occurred at the west 
edge of the intersection, and that when the deceased was 
about 15 feet away from the collision he looked up for 
the first and only time and tried to turn to his left, but 
did not succeed in making any appreciable change in 
course prior to impact (Tr. 120, 121). He also stated 
that he heard the truck horn the first time when the 
truck was 250 to 300 feet north of the intersection (Tr. 
123), and that he heard the horn again prior to the 
accident (Tr. 124). The sounding of the horn had no 
effect on the deceased as he drove his automobile west-
erly through the intersection (Tr. 125, 129). 
Officer Louis J. Brandon, witness called by plain-
tiff, arrived at the scene shortly after the accident, and 
placed the impact, based upon the physical evidence, at 
iro 
n~J 
ili~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
a point :2 feet 9 inches east of the west concrete edge of 
the higlnYay. and a trifle north of the center line of 12th 
X orth. He used the center line of the truck as imp8!.C t 
point (Tr. 68). Truck tire 1narks extended from the 
im·pact area northerly for a distance of 55 feet 10 inches, 
and at the north end were 10 to 12 feet east of ~the west 
concrete edge (Tr. 73). There were two sets of tire 
marks at the north end, but the westerly line of the 
Inarks veered off the concrete rut a point 40 feet south 
of the con1mencement point at the north (Tr. 73). After 
impact, the truck traveled 179 feet 2 inches (Tr. 67) 
along the west shoulder of the highway, where it came 
to resrt in front of a store. Deceased was apparently 
killed instantly. Driver Norton testified, however, that 
the impact severed the air lines to the brakes, and that 
he had no braking power thereafter. 
Witness Jack C. Bullock, called by plaintiff, ,testi-
fied that he was driving southward on Fifth West at a 
point lf2 mile north of the intersection when the truck 
passed his automobile (Tr. 43). At that poillf1 Bullock 
was traveling about 40 miles per hour, and he estimated 
the speed of the truck as it passed him to have been 
about 50 miles per hour (Tr. 44). He also testified, how-
ever, that between rthe point at which the truck passed 
him and the point of collision, the ·truck advanced in 
front of his automobile only a block or a block and a 
half (Tr. 47). Defendant M. Norton, however, testified 
that the truck speed was regulated by a governor, which 
in connection w~th the diesel motor speed and gears, 
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made it a physical impossibility to drive the truck faster 
than 47Jj2 m.p.h. (Tr. 158, 159). 
Witness Wesley Carter, called by plaintiff, who was 
approaching the intersection from the south, stated tha,t 
he estimated the truck was going possibly 50 or 55 miles 
per hour 150 to 180 feet north of the intersection (Tr. 
51). l-Ie also tes,tified that he noticed the Gren car 
progressing slovdy and steadily through the intersection, 
without stopping or changing its estimated speed of 10 
to 15 miles per hour (Tr. 51, 55). 
Witness Tom Bingham, called by defendants, first 
saw deceased the day of the accident in ~he early morn-
ing, when deceased came to the door of the Bingham 
home. Deceased had been drinking and was ''oiled up 
a little" (Tr. 225). He was also carrying one-half of !1 
fifth of whiskey, which he and Bingham drank between 
the time of arrival and an hour later when they went to 
the Provo River (Tr. 224). They remained at the Provo 
River, swimming and drinking (Tr. 226), un,til about 
three o'clock in the afternoon, and during this time con-
sumed an additional fifth of whiskey, more or less be-
tween them (Tr. 226). They left the Provo River and 
returned to the Bingham home, and by this time Bing-
han1 himself was so ·intoxicated tha,t he could not be sure 
of the exact condition of the deceased in this regard (Tr. 
226). Deceased thereafter left the Bingham home in his 
automobile. Within about one-half hour thereafter, 
Bingham called the Gren home, and was advised thfut the 
accident had occurred (Tr. 227). 
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feet or le~~- How can decea~Pd, by any stn•tch of the 
imagination, be deen1ed free of negligence, when, at the 
time he passed the zone, and even as he proceeded west-
erly from its protected area, the truck was in plain sight 
as it had been during his entire traverse of the inter-
section, with the horn sounding full blast and the truck 
driver attempting to avoid the collision by pulling to 
the west? 
Another recent Utah case concerned with the same 
principles of tort law, although involving a pedestrian 
and automobile, is that of Mingus vs. Olsson, 201 P. 2nd 
495 (Utah, 1949). In that case the deceased pedestrian 
sustained fatal injuries when struck by an automobile 
as he attempted to cross Thirteenth East Street in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. The automobile was proceeding south-
ward on said street at about 8:15. p.m. when the deceased 
stepped from the west curb and started across on an 
unmarked cross-walk. The language of the court empha-
sized the similarity between this case and the one before 
the court, page 498 : 
''Mrs. Venice Mingus, decedent's wife who 
was with him at the time of the accident, testified 
that as they stepped off the curb and started 
easterly .across Thirteenth East Street, decedent 
was to her left or north; that he looked neither 
to his left nor right, but looked straight ahead as 
they proceeded across the street; that he said 
nothing to her about approaching traffic; that she 
did not see or hear defendant's automobile until 
it struck; and that they had proceeded about a 
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quarter of the way (about 10 feet) across the 
street when they were struck.'' 
In affirming the directed verdict of the lower court 
the decision states, page 498: 
''More convincing than the direct testimony 
that deceased did not look, is the further evi-
dence that deceased neither said nor did any-
thing to indicate that he was at all aware of the 
danger presented by defendant's approaching 
automobile. He seems to have been wholly wn-
aware of its approach. Certainly he did nothing 
either to warn his wife, nor to rescue either him-
self or her from their position of peril. On this 
evidence, it must be said as a matter of law that 
deceased either failed to look, or having looked, 
failed to see what he should have seen. 
''There can be no doubt that a ;pedestrian who 
undertakes to cross a busy street of a large city, 
without first observing for vehicular traffic is 
guilty of contributory negligence. And this is 
true, even though he may be crossing in a cross-
walk, and have the right of way. In the recent 
case of Hickok vs. Skinner, Utah, 190 P. 2d 514, 
this court held that a motorist who had the right 
of way across an intersection, nevertheless had a 
duty to observe for traffic as he proceeded across 
the intersection. The rights of pedestrians to the 
use of the public streets are the same as those of 
motorists-neither greater nor less. Hence, the 
same general duties devolve upon them. A pedes-
trian crossing a public street in a crosswalk or 
pedestrian lane, although he may have the right 
of way QVer vehicular traffic, nonetheless has the 
duty to observe for such traffic. Clearly, dece-
dent neglected that duty in this case. It follows 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
that he was contributorily negligent as a matter 
of law. Of course we do not mean to imply that 
a mere glance in the direction of the approaching 
automobile would suffice. The duty to look has 
i-nherent in it the duty to see what is there to be 
seen. and to pay heed to it." 
In BuUock vs. Luke, 98 P. 2d 350 (Ut.), an accident 
occurred at an intersection at which there were neither 
stop signs nor traffic lights, between a northbound 
motorcycle and an eastbound truck. The facts can be 
distinguished from those of the instant case, but the 
principles of law set forth in the decision are clearly 
applicable. That case clearly holds that it is incumbent 
upon a driver to see that which is in plain sight, and to 
govern his actions aocordingly. Judgment for plaintiff 
was reversed with directions to enter judgment for de-
fendant. The decision states, page 352: 
'' ... It is sufficient if under all the circum-
stances we can properly say that Bullock's fail-
ure to see Luke was, as a matter of law, negli-
gence. When we consider that the view west on 
First South was unobstructed for a distance of 
200 to 800 feet, varying with a position from 20 
to 60 feet south of the south intersection line of 
Third West, and that through all that distance, 
and even farther, Bullock failed to see Luke, we 
believe reasonable minds cannot differ as to 
negligence on the part of Bullock.'' 
That the Utah rule is supported by the decisions of 
other States is apparent from an examination of those 
decisions. Thus, in Nelson vs. Linderman, 284 N. W. 693 
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(Mich.), southbound plaintiff collided with east bound 
defendant at a right angle intersection. Plaintiff testi-
fied that at 8 or 10 feet north of the intersection he saw 
defendant's car about 300 feet west of the intersection, 
and speeded up to 15 or 16 miles per hour, and had just 
crossed the center line when his car was struck. In 
affirming a judgment of a directed verdict for defendant, 
the court stated, page 694: 
"In the case at bar, plaintiff had to travel a 
distance of a~pproximately 35 feet in order to get 
to a place of safety. He could stop his car within 
a distance of four or five feet. Under the circum-
stances in this case, plaintiff driver's failure to 
make any observations while he was traveling the 
last 25 feet precludes recovery. Something more 
than a fleeting glance at an approaching car is 
necessary if plaintiff seeks to avoid the burden of 
contributory negligence.'' 
In Affelgren vs. Kinka, 40 A. 2d 418 (Pa.), plaintiff 
was driving southwesterly on Willow Grove and de;... 
fendant was driving southeasterly on Stenton Avenue, 
which intersected the former at right angles. There was 
a traffic light on a raised standard in the center of 
Stenton and on the northwest intersection line, which 
was to plaintiff's right as he proceeded through the in-
tersection. As plaintiff reached the intersection line, he 
saw defendant's car about 300 feet away approaching at 
a speed of 25 miles an hour. Plaintiff proceeded at 3 or 
4 miles an hour across the intersection, and when he 
reached the center of the intersection, saw defendant's 
car 60 feet away. He proceeded across, increasing his 
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speed slightly, and the front of his car had passed the 
far intersection line when defendant's car hit his car 
on the right rear. In sustaining the non-suit granted 
by the lower court, the appellate court stated: 
''The law does not permit the driving· of auto-
mobiles into and through intersections when the 
possible margin of safety is so close. On the con-
trary, it has wisely proclaimed it to be the duty 
of the driver of a vehicle crossing a two-way street 
to look to his right as he nears the Iniddle of the 
street before entering into the traffic lane coming 
from that direction ... citations ... and to yield 
the right of way to a vehicle approaching from 
the right unless so far in advance of it that in the 
exercise of care and prudence he is reasonably 
justified in believing that he can cross ahead of 
it without danger of collision ... citations ... 
Here, plaintiff had no warrant whatever for such 
a belief. Defendant admits that he himself was 
negligent, but plaintiff was so clearly guilty of 
contributory negligence that the court could not 
properly have submitted his case to the jury.'' 
In Davis vs. Baker, 28 A. 2d 740 (Maine), the court 
stated, page 7 41 : 
"The driver of an automobile intending to cross 
a street or highway in front of another car ap-
proaching from the opposite direction is charged 
with the duty of so watching and timing the move-
ments of the other car as to reasonably insure 
himself of a safe passage either in front or to the 
rear of such car and even to the point of stopping 
and waiting if necessary. A failure to comply 
with this rule spells negligence ... citations ... 
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It is equally well settled that in order to charge the 
driver coming from the opposite direction with 
negligence in pursuing his course in such a situa-
tion, it is the duty of the operator of the car mak-
ing the crossing to make known his intention to 
cross. Unless and until the car coming on its own 
right of way has such notice, its driver cannot be 
charged with negligence because of his failure to 
cease his advance ... The application of these 
rules is not avoided by the failure of the driver 
making the crossing to see the car approaching 
from the opposite direction if its presence and 
approach are obvious. An automobile driveT ·is 
bound to use his eyes to see seasonably that which 
is op1en and apparent and gov·ern himself suit-
ably. He is charged with seeing that which in 
the exercise of reasonable care ought to have been 
seen .... '' 
In Porreca vs. North Cleaners,& Dyers, 23 A. 2d 72 
(Pa.), defendant's truck, which was westbound on an 
arterial highway, collided with plaintiff's car which was 
northbound on a street intersecting at right angles. 
Plaintiff had stopped at the stop sign before crossing. 
Plaintiff was traveling about 3 to 5 miles per hour upon 
entering the intersection and saw defendant's truck 
approaching about 140 feet to the east and 'plaintiff's 
right, at a speed of about 35 to 45 miles per hour. 
Plaintiff could have stopped his car at this speed in two 
or three feet. When he reached the southerly end of a 
double set of street car tracks extending east and west, 
the defendant's truck had covered about one-third to 
one-half of the distance toward the intersection from 
the point where first seen. Plaintiff crossed the double 
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tracks and was struck by the truck. Judgment sustain-
ing defendant's motion for judgment n. o. Y. affirmed. 
At page 73, the decision states: 
· · ": e Inay assume that the driYer of defen-
dant's truck was negligent, but plaintiff was also 
neg·ligent when he took a chance and did not look 
again before entering the westbound traffic lane 
of Snyder Avenue .... He had no right to enter 
therein unless, in the exercise of reasonable care 
and prudence, he was justified in believing that 
he could get across ahead of defendant's truck ... 
Without having observed the location of the ap-
proaching truck he had no basis for such a belief.'' 
And at page 74: 
''Plaintiff, according to his own testimony, 
could have stop:ped when he reached the east-
bound trolley tracks and saw defendant's truck 
rapidly approaching in the westbound traffic lane 
then 90 to 120 feet distant. It was only when his 
automobile had gone from the north rail of the 
westbound trolley track into the westbound traffic 
lane that he looked again to his right and saw 
that an accident was unavoidable (25a). Had he 
continued to look for the truck approaching from 
his right, he could have stopped, as he stated, 
within a foot or two, and the accident would have 
been averted. The principle has been many times 
repeated that a driver who enters a street inter-
section without looking for vehicles proceeding on 
the cross street, or who looks but proceeds directly 
into the path of a rapidly ap:proaching vehicle, is 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law. At 
an intersection, a driver must not only look for 
cross traffic but must continue to look as he 
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crosses in order to avoid a possible collision: 
J aski et ux v. West Park Daily Cleaners & Dyers 
Inc., 334 Pa. 12, at page 14, 5 A. 2d 105, at page 
106. Plaintiff having twice observed the truck ap-
proaching on his right did not discharge his duty 
by attempting to cross in its path without again 
taking precautions against its obvious speed of 
approach on a wet and slippery street or contin-
uing his observation of the oncoming· truck. Toyer 
v. Hilleman, 320 Pa. 417, 183 A. 53. It does not 
contribute in the least to plaintiff's contention 
that he \Yas without fault to consider the respec-
tive distances and speeds of the two vehicles. On 
the contrary, it is obvious upon such an examin-
ation that they were bound to meet. Cf. Woerner 
v. Heim, supra. 
''The exercise of reasonable prudence re-
quired plaintiff to wait f.or the truck to :pass. Clee 
v. Brinks, Inc., 135 P. Super. 345, 355, 5 A. 2nd 
387. And his failure to look and to govern himself 
accordingly before entering the westbound traffic 
lane of Snyder Avenue clearly convicts him of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law. Lewis 
v. Hermann, supra, 112 Pa. Super, page 341, 171 
A. 109. There were no other vehicles in the inter-
section or within the range of plaintiff's vision, 
and his failure to look again at the truck after 
reaching the eastbound trolley tracks and before 
entering its path is inexplicable on any ground but 
negligence.'' 
In Carey vs. DeRose, 282 N. W. 165 (Mich.), the 
decision states, page 165: 
"We have repeatedly held that one must look 
before entering a place of possible danger, such 
as crossing an intersection, and maintain obser-
vation while crossing. 
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.. ~lr. Justice Sharpe, in writing the opinion 
of the court in Knight v. ~lerignac, 281 Mich. 684, 
:275 N. \Y. 73:2, quoted, with approval, the follow-
ing from Zuideina v. Bekkering, 256 lVlich. 327, 
239 X. \Y. 333: 
·It will not do to say that plaintiff's hus-
band looked down the Byron Center road to 
the left before attempting to cross the paYe-
ment and did not see the automobile of de-
fendant approaching. He must be held to 
have seen what he should have seen, which 
there was nothing to prevent him from see-
ing, and if, as contended by plaintiff, he 
stopped his automobile, looked to the left, and 
did not see what was plainly to be seen, the 
approach of defendant's automobile, he was 
guilty of contributory negligence which would 
bar plaintiff's recovery.' 
"In Brown v. Lilli, 281 Mich. 170, 274 N. W. 
751, Mr. Justice Chandler, in writing the opinion, 
said (page 752) : 
'The accident occurred in the day time, 
and the facts display nothing to indicate that 
plaintiff could not have seen deftmdant 's ap-
proaching automobile had she made proper 
observation before attempting to cross the 
pavement. On the contrary, it stands undis-
puted that she could have had a clear unob-
structed view of the road and could have 
seen defendant for a distance of 1215 feet. 
Although she testified that she did look and 
saw nothing, if she looked and failed to see 
that which was plainly visible, she will be held 
in point of law to have seen it and guilty of 
contributory negligence ... ' '' 
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Again, in Johnson v .. Harrison, 172 S. E. 259, (V'a.), 
plaintiff was driving West, and defendant was driving 
North, on highways intersecting at right angles. Plain-
tiff had an unobstructed view of the highway on which 
defendant ~as driving for about ljlO of a mile, and de-
fendant likewise had a similar view of the highway 
whereon plaintiff was driving. Plaintiff stated he looked 
to his left when about ljlO of a mile from the intersec-
tion, and did not see defendant, and that he did not look 
again until he entered the intersection, when defendant 
was 40 feet away, travelling at 50 miles per hour. Ver-
dict for plaintiff was set aside by the trial eourt, and 
judgment rendered for defendant. Judgment affirmed 
on appeal. The decision, page 260, was as follows: 
"The fact that the plaintiff had, under the 
Motor Vehicle Law of Virginia (Laws 1926, c. 
474, as amended), the right of way over the de-
fendant on this occasion, in no degree could have 
excused him for his failure to look for the defen-
dant, who driving at 50 miles per hour, would 
necessarily have been seen by the plaintiff if he 
had kept a proper lookout. It cannot be said that 
the failure of the defendant to yield the right of 
way to the plaintiff was the sole proxim:ate cause 
of the accident because it could not have occurred 
except for the concurring negligence of the plain-
tiff in driving into the intersection without looking 
for the defendant. The law imposed upon the 
plaintiff the duty of exercising ordinary care for 
his safety, even though he had the prior right to 
cross the intersection ahead of the defendant. 
The driver of an :automobile will not be permitted 
to drive blindly into another fast approaching 
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autonwbile sin1ply because he has the right of way 
over such other automobile. For the plaintiff to 
stand upon his right of way and fail or refuse- to 
look for another automobile which is using the 
intersecting road when such other automobile is 
in plain view and approaching at a dangerous 
speed is the clearest kind of concurring negli-
gence." 
And, at Page 261 : 
'• In Blashfield 's Cyclopedia of Automobile 
Law, vol. 1, p. 494, we read: 
'' 'Too firm an insistence upon the right of 
way, even when one is clearly entitled to it, may 
be the grossest kind of negligence. Under such 
rule, if it app~ars to the driver of the car having 
the right of way, or if he can, by the exercise of 
care commensurate with the danger of the situa-
tion, discover that the other driver does not in-
tend to yield the right of way, or intends to take 
precedence, and that a collision will likely occur, 
he cannot recklessly proceed, but is bound to stop 
or to turn aside, if, in the exercise of ordinary care 
for his own safety, he can do so. * * * ' '' 
In Yellow Cab Co. of Virginia v. Gulley, 194 S. Et. 
683, (Va.), judgment for plaintiff was reversed, and 
judgment for defendant entered. The Court stated, at 
page 686: 
''The law requires the driver of a car to keep 
a proper lookout, in order that he may avail him-
self of what the lookout discloses to prevent in-
jury to himself as well as to others. Keeping a 
lookout is without avail unless one utilizes the in-
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formation thereby secured. One who keeps a 
lookout, amd fails to take advantage of what it 
discloses, is as guilty of negligence as one who 
fails to keep a lookout. The result is the same. 
He who doesn't take heed of a danger signal, 
plainly seen with the eyes, might just as well 
shut his eyes to the signal. It is as true today 
as it was in the days of the prophet Is:aiah, that 
the fate of one who seeth but observeth not, is 
preordained. The rule that one should exercise 
ordinary and reasonable care to avoid danger is 
as old as the law of self-preservation. None are 
so blind as those who will not see. 
''The car of the plaintiff was in a place of 
safety when the owner and her driver had knowl-
edge of the danger immediately in their front, 
and instantly coming closer. Heedless of every 
sense of precaution, in the face of a known dan-
ger, they proceeded closer to it, and if they did 
not actively and actually thrust themselves into 
the danger, they did, in fact, invite it. Even if 
she had the right of way, she was not absolved 
from exercising due care and ordinary circum-
spection to avoid injury to herself and others. 
Nicholson v. Garland, 156 V a. 7 45, 158 S.E. 901; 
Johnson v. Harrison, 161 Va. 804, 172 S.E. 259. '' 
Another point merits consideration. The defendant 
was proceeding upon an arterial highway protected by 
stop signs as he approached the intersection. When the 
deceased was between the stop sign and the east edge 
of the concrete portion of the intersection, the defend-
ant's truck was in plain sight upon the highway at a 
point from 250 to 300 feet north and traveling at a speed 
between 35 and 50 miles per hour. This was a large 
\fl' I 
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heavily loaded vehicle and any person who drives a car 
knows that such a vehicle cannot be stopped within the 
distance of a light passenger car. At this point, the truck 
constituted ·an immediate hazard, and it was the impera-
tive duty of the deceased to have remained where he 
was and yielded the right of way of the entire intersec-
tion to the truck. Although we do not believe that the 
right of way of the truck is of vital importance under 
the circumstances of this case, nevertheless it is sub-
mitted that the right of way at all times here involved 
was in favor of that truck. 
For the reasons indicated, the court erred in deny-
ing the motion for a directed verdict. 
Error No.2 
Error No. 2 is directed to the failure of the court 
to grant Defendants' motion for a nonsuit made at the 
conclusion of the Plaintiffs' testimony. The grounds for 
the motion are set out in the transcript at pages 110 to 
113, and are the same as the grounds stated for the 
motion for a directed verdict except that the last two 
grounds for the directed verdict were added at the time 
the latter motion was made (Tr. 234), and the following 
ground was added to the motion for non-suit: 
8. That the evidence in this case shows 
without dispute, that 5th West street in Provo, 
Utah, was a through highway, and also that the 
deceased entered said intersection, after leaving 
said stop sign, located on the northeast corner of 
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said intersection-and that the deceased then pro-
ceeded through said intersection to a point where 
he was south of the island on said through high-
way on 5th West street, which island separates 
the north bound traffic from the south bound 
traffic; and that at that time, the defendants' 
truck w:as approaching the pling or place on the 
west half of said 5th West street where, if the 
defendant Preston Norton, proceeded south, anJ 
the deceased proceeded west their line of travel 
would meet, and that at said time, that is, when 
the deceased was south of the island the de-
fendants' truck was approaching the intersection 
and was so close thereto as to constitute an im-
mediate hazard; and that the deceased failed to 
keep any proper look out, or in fact any look out 
at all, or failed to bring his automobile to a stop 
south of said island, and .allow the defendants' 
truck to 'proceed on south, and that instead of so 
doing, the deceased continued on west without 
keeping a proper or any look out into the line of 
travel and to the point towards which the de-
fendants' truck was proceeding; and that by 
reason of such failure the deceased was negligent, 
as a matter of law, and that his said negligence 
proximately contributed to the collision involved 
in this case, and the resulting death of the de-
ceased. 
For obvious reasons, the argument and authorities 
relative to the failure of the court to grant a directed 
verdict are in a large measure applicable. At the time 
of the non-suit, there was no evidence relative to intoxi-
cation, and defendant Preston Norton had not testified. 
Paul Adamson's testimony relative to the movement of 
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the Gren car across the easterly half of the intersection 
was not before the court. 
The witnesses called by plaintiff, however, clearly 
established the speed and movement of the Gren car as 
it passed through the intersection, and in particular, 
detail as to how that car moved from the safety zone 
area westward. The testimony was not so complete as 
it was at the conclusion of the case, but the salient fea-
tures were before the court and the contributory negli-
gence of the deceased was established. All of the physical 
characteristics of the intersection were in evidence. 
The reasons which should have caused the court to 
grant a directed verdict are in net effect applicable to 
this motion, upon the evidence before t'he court at the 
time this motion was made. 
Errors Nos. 3 and 4 
These errors are directed to the trial court's ins true.. 
tion No. 5 and also paragraph two thereof. There the 
jury is charged as follo"WE (R. 164) : 
No.5 
You are instructed that, unless you find by a 
preponderance or greater weight of the evidence, 
that at the time and place alleged in the com-
plaint, the defendant Preston L. Norton, while 
operating his automobile, was guilty of one or 
more of the acts or omissions set forth in para-
graph Five of the Complaint, within the Instruc-
tion number One above, and unless you further 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
find by a preponderance or greater weight of the 
evidence, that such act, or acts, omission or 
omissions, were the ·proximate cause, as herein-
after defined, of the collision, resulting in the 
death of deceased, you must find the issues in 
this case in favor of the defendants and against 
the plaintiffs and return your verdict of no cause 
of action. 
But if from a preponderance or greater weight 
of the evidence, it is established that the defend-
ant, Preston L. Norton, while operating his truck 
and trailer at the time and place alleged, was 
guilty of one or more of the acts or omissions so 
charged, and you further find from a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that such act or acts of 
omission or omissions, proximately caused, as 
hereinafter defined to you, the death of deceased, 
then it is your duty to return your verdict in 
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants 
and to fix the amount of the damages suffered by 
the plaintiffs; unless you also find by .a prepon"" 
derance of the evidence that the deceased, at the 
time of the collision, was guilty of contributory 
negligence as hereinafter defined, and that such 
negligence proximately contributed to the cause 
of the death of deceased. 
The net effect of the instruction is to submit the 
case to the jury upon all of the alleged grounds of 
negligence set forth in paragraph 5 of the complaint• 
which were specifically outlined in Instruction No. 1 
of the trial court (R. 157). These are the acts of negli-
gence referred to above: excessive and unlawful speed; 
driving without due regard for and in violation of 
traffic rules and regulations; failure to keep a lookout; 
a: 
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fa;ilure to operate the truck so as to be able to stop or 
control the same within a reasonable distance in an 
emergency; failure to apply the brakes; steering the 
truck on the west portion of the paved portion of the 
highway and onto the direct shoulder, instead of re-
maining on the paved portion of the highway. 
There was no evidenct> as to many, if not all, of 
these grounds of negligence, and to so instruct the jury 
as to permit them to find against the defendants on all 
or any of these grounds was prejudicial error. 
In Woodward v. Spring Canyon Coal Co., 90 Utah 
578, 63 P. 2d 267, th€ court stated, page 273: 
"It is the settled law in this jurisdiction that 
negligence must be both charged .and proved. A 
failure of either is fatal. Here there was a failure 
of both. It is equally well established that it is 
prejudicial error to permit the jury to find a 
verdict based upon either negligence not charged 
or negligence charged but not shown ... '' 
In Kendall v. Fordham, 79 Utah 256, 9 P. 2d 183, 
at page 259: 
''The trial court submitted to the jury for its 
consideration and determination the question of 
whether or not the defendant was negligent as to 
each and all of the alleged acts of negligence 
charged in the complaint. Defendant requested 
the court to charge the jury that there is no evi-
dence that the starting of the fire in defendant's 
.automobile was due to the negligence of the de-
fendant, and also that the alleged negligence of 
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the defendant in parking his automobile near 
plaintiffs' wheat field was withdrawn from the 
consideration of the jury. The refusal of the 
court to so instruct the jury is assigned as error. 
The law is well settled in this jurisdiction, as 
well as elsewhere, that it is reversible error for 
a court to submit a charged act of negligence to 
a jury for its consideration and determination in 
the absence of evidence tending to show the 
existence of the negligence complained of ... '' 
In Industrial 0 ommission v. Wasatch G~ading Co., 
80 Utah 223, 14 P. 2d 988, page 240: 
''It is a well-established rule of law in this, 
as well as other jurisdictions, that the acts of 
negligence relied upon by the plaintiff for a re-
covery must be both alleged and proved. It is 
reversible error to instruct the jury that they 
may find a verdict for a plaintiff because of some 
negligence which is not pleaded or which is with-
out support in the evidence ... '' 
So far as the ground of negligence relative to fail-
ure to keep a lookout is concerned, the evidence clearly 
shows that defendant Preston Norton was maintaining a 
degree of lookout far greater than was actually required. 
He testified that he saw the Gren car prior to the time 
that it entered the intersection, and when it was in the 
area between the stop sign and the east concrete edge 
of the highway, and that his eyes remained on that car 
during the entire time that it was traveling across the 
intersection and up to the point of impact. Not only is 
this evidence uncontradicted, but it is substantiated by 
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defendant's affirmative acts of sounding the truck horn, 
of applying the brakes, and in edging to the \vest. There 
wa~ no evidence upon which the jury could have found 
defendant guilty of failure to keep a lookout which had 
any casual connection with the accident. 
Another ground of negligence is that of violating 
traffic rules and regulations, yet nowhere in the instruc-
tions is there any indication as to the nature of these 
rules ·and regulations, and we are at a loss to discern 
any evidence which could have been said to constitute 
such a violation in any event. The jury is left free to 
speculate upon their own ideas as to what rules and 
regulations might exist, and in that existence, apply to 
the facts of this case. 
A further ground of negligence is that of failing to 
apply the brakes. The evidence was that the defendant 
applied the brakes immediately upon the first indication 
that deceased was going to so continue his travel as to 
come into the path of the defendant's truck. Defendant 
stated, and his testimony is uncontradicted and amply 
supported by the physical evidence, that he immediately 
applied the brakes when there was anything to indicate 
the necessity of so doing. Wherein was there any evi-
dence to submit this issue of negligence to the jury? 
Again, the court advises' the jury that another 
ground of negligence upon which they can find a verdict 
for the defendant was the act of the defendant in driving 
his car to the westerly side of the intersection and onto 
the shoulder instead of remaining on the paved portion 
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of the highway. If this can be said to be a definition of 
an act of negligence, wherein are the legal standards 
of care to be applied in making this determination~ 
Those standards are not in this instruction nor are they 
elsewhere. If the instruction on this point had been in 
any way properly framed, which it obviously was not, 
it would have still been error to have submitted the 
ground to the jury because the evidence shows that the 
defendant did the only thing he could have done in an 
attempt to avoid the accident, and that his action in this 
regard actually gave the plaintiff additional time and 
space within which he could have stopped the car and 
avoided the collision. Had the defendant continued on 
a straight course he would have likewise collided with 
the Gren car. To have turned to the left when the Gren 
car was in the position it was, in the intersection, with 
ample opportunity to stop, and where any reasonable 
man would have stopped, was likewise beyond the realm 
of possible required action. 
The next ground was that of failing to operate the 
truck so as to be able to stop or control the same within 
a reasonable distance in .an emergency. Again, the 
balance of the instructions fail to clarify the applicable 
rules of law even if they could be applied in any proper 
instruction. 
See also ~walker v. Butterworth, 210 Pac. 813 (Wash.) 
tic 
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Errors Nos. 5 and 6 
These errors are directed to the trial court's Instruc-
tion No. 6 and also to paragraph 3 thereof. There, the 
jury is charged as follows (R. 165): 
No.6 
You are instructed that it is the duty of a 
driver of a motor vehicle upon the public high-
way~ of this ~tate to at all times exercise due 
care and diligence in order to prevent injury to 
persons or property lawfully upon the highway. 
Included in this duty to use due care and diligence, 
is the duty to constantly keep a lookout not only 
ahead, but to the sides of his vehicle, and to actu-
ally see, as well as to look for, all persons, objects 
and things which are reasonably within the range 
of his vision, and which may constitute a hazard. 
It is then his further duty after having seen, or 
after he should have seen to use such care and 
diligence as a reasonable and prudent person, 
having due regard to all conditions of the high-
way; the presence of intersections; obstructions 
or any other condition which may produce a haz-
ard, would use to prevent injury. 
And in the event that a driver fails, or ne-
glects at any time to exercise such reasonable 
care and diligence, he is negligent. And if, as a 
proximate result of such negligence, injury or 
damage is caused to any person, the driver so 
causing the injury or damage, is liable to the 
person thus injured for all damages sustained by 
reason of such negligence, unless such person is, 
himself, negligent and his negligence proximately 
contribute to produce the injury. 
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Thus, if you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence, in this case, that the defendant, while 
operating his truck-trailer failed to use the de-
gree of care and caution as set forth above, and 
that as a direct and proximate result thereof, 
Melvin V. Gren was killed your verdict should 
be in favor of the plaintiffs for such sum as 
you shall determine from a preponderance of 
the evidence the 'plaintiffs have suffered, unless 
you also find that the deceased, Melvin V. Gren, 
was also negligent in some respect and such 
negligence proximately contributed to produce 
the accident with its consequent death of deceased. 
The vice of this instruction is very similar to that 
of Instruction No. 5 which was considered in Errors 3 
and 4, supra, and much of the reasoning there set forth 
is equally applicable. The court attempts to define the 
duty of maintaining a proper lookout in the first para-
graph of this instruction. The definition itself is faulty 
since it requires a constant lookout for all objects within 
range of vision which might constitute a hazard. It 
would be somewhat difficult, if not impossible, to con-
stantly look to the sides and front of a vehicle. 
The greater difficulty arises, however, from the 
duty imposed after the driver has seen or should have 
seen some hazard. The court sets out that duty as follows: 
" ... It is then his further duty after having 
seen, or after he should have seen to use such 
care .and diligence as a reasonable and prudent 
person, having due regard to all conditions of 
the highway; the presence of intersections; ob-
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structions or any other condition which may pro-
duce a hazard, would use to prevent injury." 
The driver is in net effect called upon to prevent 
injury. because the clear implication is that a reasonable 
and prudent person would have done something to pre-
vent that injury. It is neither a clear nor correct state-
ment of applicable law. Moreover, the net effect of the 
instruction is to submit to the jury negligence in 
general terms, for although the instruction apparently 
comn1ences on the theory that it is concerned with failure 
to keep a lookout it goes on to add a ge1n~ral duty of cart-
having due regard to highway conditions, presence ot 
intersections, and obstruction or any other condition 
which may produce a hazard. Also, this instruction seems 
to indicate that the court views the intersection as two 
separate intersections since the plural is used, although in 
Intruction No. 21 (R. 175) the jury is clearly told that 
the intersection is to be viewed as a single intersection. 
The evidence is also clear that there was no obstruction, 
either in the form of other traffic or physical structures 
to interfere with the view of deceased as he proceeded 
across the intersection. 
Again, this instruction submits the issue of negli-
gence to the jury on a general theory, notwithstanding 
the fact that specific acts of negligence are alleged in 
the complaint. It is difficult to conceive anything more 
prejudicial that to repeatedly indicate to the jury that 
they may so speculate and find. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
48 
ERRORS NOS. 7 and 8 
These errors are directed to the trial court's instruc-
tion No. 8 and to paragraph 3 thereof. There, the jury 
is charged as follows (R. 167): 
No.8 
You are instructed that 5th West street in 
Provo, Utah, was, at the time of the accident 
herein referred to, a through highway. 
It is the law of this state that the driver of a 
vehicle shall stop at the entrance to a through 
highway, and shall yield the right of way to other 
vehicles which have entered the intersection from 
said through highway, or which are approaching 
so closely on said through highway as to consti-
tute an immediate hazard, but said driver having. 
so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all 
other vehicles approaching the intersection on 
said through highway shall yield the right of 
way to the vehicle so proceeding into or across 
the through highway. 
This simply means that deceased was not re-
quired to cross the said intersection at his peril, 
.and that, if you find froln a preponderance of the 
evidence that deceased entered the intersection 
of 5th West and 12th North, at a time when the 
truck of defendants was not within the intersec-
tion, or so close thereto as to constitute an im-
mediate hazard, then you are instructed that it 
was lawful for deceased to proceed into said 
intersection with the intention of crossing the 
same, and that it became the duty of the said 
defendant Preston L. Norton, to slow up1 or stop 
if necessary, to permit the deceased to continue 
ilia 
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on through said intersection. Under such condi-
tions, you are further instructed that the de-
ceased, :Mehin V. Gren, was not required to re-
frain from attempting to pass through said in-
tersection merely because defendants' truck may 
have been at such time so far distant that a 
reasonably prudent person, under like circum-
stances, would conclude that the deceased had 
sufficient time to cmnpletely cross the said inter-
section. 
However, if you find by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that defendants' truck was so close 
to said intersection as to indicate to a reasonably 
prudent person, under like circumstances, that 
the deceased in attempting to cross said intersec-
tion, would create an immediate hazard, then it 
was the duty of the deceased to wait and permit 
the defendants' truck to pass through the inter-
section, before continuing across. 
Paragraph three of this instruction advises the jury 
that if the truck was not within the intersection, or so 
close as to constitute an immediate hazard, then the 
deceased could enter with the intention of crossing, and 
that ''it became the duty of the said defendant Preston 
L. Norton, to slow up, or stop if necessary, to permit the 
deceased to continue on through said intersection.'' 
Since under the evidence, there was no question that the 
deceased entered the intersection prior to the defendant's 
truck, the only possible reason why he might have had 
the right of way was that the truck was not so close as 
to constitute an immediate hazard. Yet nowhere in this 
instruction, or in any other instruction, is there a defini-
tion or indication as to what facts might render the 
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truck an immediate hazard, and this, notwithstanding a 
specific request for such an instruction in defendants' 
request No. 7 (R. 146). 
In any event, however, the instruction ignores the 
physical characteristics of the intersection. Here, there 
was a safety zone more than adequate to properly shelter 
the Gren car had the deceased wanted or desired to stop, 
and he could have so stopped easily at the speed his car 
was traveling. Assuming that the general theory of the 
instruction was in any way correct, which we deny, it 
should have advised the jury as to the actions of a 
reasonably prudent man in regard to leaving the shel-
tered area of the safety zone. If this instruction is con-
sidered in connection with Instruction No. 21 (R. 175), 
the difficulty becomes even more apparent because that 
instruction advises the jury that the intersection is a 
single intersection even though it contains ''neutral zones 
separating opposing traffic lanes.'' In other words, if the 
jury determined that the approaching truck did not con-
stitute an immediate hazard, then the deceased had 
carte blanche authority to proceed across the intersection. 
This clearly is not the law. As was stated in Hickok v. 
Skinner,, supra, at page 517: 
" ... It is not unusual for drivers crossing a 
wide arterial highway such as this to proceed 
across the near half of the street and then stop 
or come to a near .stop near the middle to permit 
the passage of through traffic on the other half.'' 
o[ 
~~ 
ta 
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Errors Nos. 9 and 10 
These errors are directed to the trial court's Instruc-
tion No. 17 and to the latter portion thereof following 
the first sentence. There, the jury was charged as follows 
(R.172): 
No. 17 
You are instructed that, until the contrary is 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence, there 
is a presumption that the deceased, Melvin V. 
Gren, was exercising due and proper care for the 
protection of his person and the preservation of 
his life, at the time of the accident; this presump-
tion arises from the instinct of self-preservation 
and the disposition of man to avoid personal 
harm. This presumption is not conclusive, but is 
a matter to be considered by the jury, in connec-
tion with all the other facts and circumstances in 
the case, in determining whether or not the de-
ceased Melvin V. Gren, was guilty of contributory 
negligence at the time of the accident. 
While such a presumption may exist in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary, it ceases to have any force 
where the evidence shows that the deceased drove his 
car directly into the path of an approaching truck when 
one glance would have permitted him to have avoided 
the accident. Moreover the instruction not only improp-
erly advises the jury of this 'presumption, but permits 
it to be considered along with and as a part of other 
evidence in the case. The Utah Law holds this to be 
prejudicial error. 
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The decision of In .re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 
484, 5 P. 2d 230, state's: 
"When however, the facts and circumstances 
were shown concerning which the presumption 
was indulged, the presumption ceased, and the 
controversy was to be decided upon the evidence 
adduced independently of the presumption. In 
other words, the presumption was not itself evi-
dence and had no weight as evidence . . . The 
rule is well stated in the case of Peters v. Lohr, 
supra, as follows: 
'A presumption is not evidence of any-
thing, and only relates to a rule of law as to 
which party shall first go forward and pro-
duce evidence sustaining a matter in issue. 
A presumption will serve as and in the place 
of evidence in favor of one party or the other 
until prima facie evidence has been adduced 
by the opposite party; but the presumption 
should never be placed in the scale to be 
weighed as evidence. The presumption, when 
the opposite party has produced prima facie 
evidence, has spent its force and served its 
purpose, and the party then, in whose favor 
the presumption operated, must meet his op-
ponent's prima facie evidence with evidence, 
and not presumptions. A presumption is not 
evidence of a fact, but purely a conclusion'." 
See also In re Pilcher's Estate, 197 P. 2d 143; Mingus 
v. Olsson, supra. 
to 
m 
~[ 
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Error No. 11 
This error is directed to a portion of the trial court's 
Instruction No. 19. There the jury was charged as 
follows (R. 174): 
"'Further, if you should find the issues in 
favor of the plaintiffs, you may assess as dam-
ages, the cost of the funeral and burial expense, 
which said sum shall not be in excess of $558.50. '' 
Over defendants' objections, the court allowed the 
introduction of evidence relative to the payment by the 
surviving widow of the funeral bill of deceased in the 
amount of $558.50 (Tr. 104, 105). There is not a scintilla 
of evidence in the record, however, showing the insol-
vency of the estate or anything connected with the estate, 
and nothing to show that any claim for reimbursement 
was ever attempted by the surviving widow. For these 
reasons, there was no basis upon which the court could 
have allowed the jury to recover these damages, and it 
was error to so instruct. 
In Morr-ison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P. 2d 772, 
the court states, pages 780, 781: 
"It is elementary that a party may not en-
hance damages. Every party must 'exercise rea-
onable care and diligence to avoid loss or to mini-
mize or lessen the resulting damage, and to the 
extent that his damages are the result of his ac-
tive :and unreasonable enhancement thereof or are 
due to his failure to exercise such care and dili-
gence, he cannot recover.' 15 Am. Jur. p. 420, 
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Sec. 27. An heir who has paid funeral expenses 
for the death of an adult should not be permitted 
to enhance the damages by reason of his failure 
to seek reimbursement from the estate. The heir 
in such a case is not legally obligated to pay fu-
neral expenses, but the estate has a primary legal 
obligation. 
''We conclude that before a plaintiff may re-
cover funeral expenses in an action under 104-3~ 
11, R.S.U. 1933, he must show that the estate is 
insolvent and unable to pay such funeral expense. 
and that the plaintiff or one of the heirs has paid 
or that he has entered into a legally enforcible 
obligation to pay the funeral expenses.'' 
Error No.12 
Error No. 12 is directed to the following portion of 
trial court's Instruction No. 21 (R. 175): 
No. 21 
That the intersection of 5th West street and 
12th North, where the accident occurred, consti-
tutes a single intersection even though 5th West 
at that point has neutral zones separating oppos-
ing traffic lanes. 
It is not contended by the defendants that the mere 
fact of a safety zone in the middle of a highway next 
adjacent to the intersection changes the general rules of 
law applicable to intersections. It is, however, contended 
that this particular instruction creates a false impression 
in the minds of the jury as to what effect, if any, should 
be given to the existence of the safety zone in determining 
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this particular case. The instruction tells the jury, in 
net effect, that the intersection of the accident is a single 
intersection, even though a neutral zone separates oppos-
ing traffic lanes. When this instruction is considered in 
connection with Instruction No. 8 (R. 167) it would lead 
the jury to believe that the existence of the safety zone 
was of no consequence in this action, and that the de-
ceased could proceed with impunity across the inter-
section once his right to commence this course of action 
had arisen. Such an instruction is extremely prejudicial 
since it .permits the jury to ignore one of the most 
essential physical features of the intersection, so far 
as the defense of the action is concerned. 
Error No. 13 
This error is directed to the trial court's Instruction 
No. 23. There the jury is charged as follows (R. 177): 
No. 23 
The court instructs the jury that in the event 
you should find the deceased may have been guilty 
of negligence which contributed to the accident 
and to his death, by putting himself in a position 
of peril, yet if, thereafter, the defendant, seeing 
the position in which the deceased was, had an 
opportunity by the exercise of reasonable care 
and diligence, to save the deceased from the con-
sequence of his negligence, it was the defendant's 
duty to do so ; and if he failed to do so, and that 
such failure was the ·proximate cause of the death 
of the deceased, the plaintiff may still recover by 
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reason of what is called the last clear chance 
doctrine. 
This instruction clearly submits the case to the jury 
on the theory of the last clear chance doctrine, and the 
instruction itself so states. Not only has this court repeat-
edly held that the doctrine is of limited application to col-
lisions involving two moving cars at an intersection, but 
in this particular case, such a submission completely 
ignores the established facts. The doctrine, as will be 
hereinafter noted in the cited authorities, clearly ccn-
tem·plates that the defendant knew and appreciated the 
danger to the car of the deceased at a time when it was 
possible for the defendant to take an affirmative act 
which would have avoided the collision, notwithstanding 
the deceased had himself negligently assumed a position 
of peril from which he could not extricate himself. 
In this case, the peril of the deceased was not appar-
ent until he had left the area of the safety zone in the 
center of the highway and commenced proceeding from 
this point westward. There was no reason whatsoever 
for the defendant, Preston Norton, to assume that the 
sheltered area would not serve the purpose for which it 
was intended, and that the deceased would stop at that 
point. When deceased left the safety zOne, however, it 
was then too late for the defendant to effectively prevent 
the accident. His truck was approximately 100 feet away 
at that time, travelling at a speed from 35 to 50 miles 
per hour, and the testimony conclusive!~ shows that the 
application of the brakes could not and did not stop the 
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truck before reaching the point of impact. So far as 
turning to the west, the truck did edge as far as it was 
practicable to do so without ultimately colliding with 
the :::;ervice station which \Yas located at the southwest 
corner. So far as warning, the evidence sho\YS that at 
that point, the truck horn was steadily sounding. It is 
clear that the necessary elements for application of this 
doctrine were entirely lacking in the instant case, and 
the negligence of the deceased was a continuing and con-
tributing factor of the accident, if not the sole factor, 
up to the point of the collision. 
Hickok v. Skinner, supra} specifically points out that 
the last clear -chance doctrine is of limited application in 
the portion of the opinion quoted under argument in con-
nection with Error 1, herein. 
Although the facts of Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah 
346, 166 P. 2d 230 are markedly different from those of 
the present case, the language of the decision discusses 
the doctrine at length, and shows that the use of the 
word ''clear'' is advisedly used in defining the doctrine. 
At page 237, the court states: 
''One should not be held liable for failing to 
avoid the effect of the other's negligence in a 
situation where it is speculative as to whether he 
was afforded a clear opportunity to avoid it. In 
a situation where both parties are on the move 
the significance of the word ''clear'' is most im-
portant. Otherwise we may put the onus of 
avoiding the effect of one's negligence on a party 
not negligent. That party's negligence only arises 
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when it is definitely established that there was 
ample time and opportunity to avoid the acci-
dent which was not taken advantage of.'' 
The case of Johnson v. Sacramento Northern Ry., 
129 P. 2d 503 involved a collision between a motorcyclist 
and a train, but contains an excellent summary of the 
doctrine. At page 505 the court details the elements 
which must be present to apply the doctrine: 
"Before examining the evidence in greater 
detail, it is appropriate to refer to the essential 
elements which must be present to warrant a 
recovery, under the last clear chance doctrine, by 
one who has himself been guilty of negligence. 
Said doctrine may be said to be an exce'ption to 
the general rule and its application is limited to 
those cases in which all of said elements are 
!present. In the frequently cited case of Palmer 
v. Tschudy, 191 Cal. 696, at page 700, 218 p. 36, 
at page 37, the court said: 'The last clear chance 
rule presupposes: That the plaintiff has been 
negligent; that as a result thereof she is in a 
situation of danger from which she cannot escape 
by the exercise of ordinary care; that the de-
fendant is aware of her dangerous situation 
under such circumstances that he realizes, or 
ought to realize, her inability to escape therefrom; 
that he then has a cle.ar chance to avoid injuring 
her by the exercise of ordinary care, and fails to 
do so. If all of these elements are present, the 
rule applies and enables the plaintiff to recover, 
notwithstanding her own negligence. But if any 
of them be absent the rule does not apply, and 
the case is governed by the ordinary rules of 
negligence and contributory negligence.' 
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And at pag·e 506: 
''It is al~o sig·nificant to note that the 'situation 
of danger' or 'position of danger', referred to in 
the authorities dealing with the last clear chance 
doctrine, is reached only when a plaintiff, moving 
toward the path of an oncoming train or vehicle, 
has reached a position 'from which he cannot 
escape by the exercise of ordinary care.' In other 
words, it is not enough, under the last clear chance 
doctrine, that plaintiff is merely approaching a 
position of danger, he has the same opportunity;. 
to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary 
care, as has the defendant. In such cases, the 
ordinary rules of negligence and contributory 
negligence apply, rather than the exceptional doc-
trine of last clear chance. It is only in cases in 
which, after plaintiff reaches a ·position of danger, 
defendant has a last clear chance to avoid the 
accident by the exercise of ordinary care, and 
.plaintiff has no similar chance, that the doctrine 
is applicable.'' 
The language above is of particular application to 
the instant case, because the deceased himself repeatedly 
had an opportunity to have stopped and avoided the 
collision, and at a time when the defendant could do 
nothing to so avoid the accident himself. This was true at 
the time the deceased reached the safety zone, and it 
was true between the west edge of the safety zone and 
at least ten feet to the west of that edge. The testimony 
conclusively showed that it was utterly in1possible to 
stop the truck at this point because of its weight and 
rate of travel. 
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In Poncino v. Reid-Murdock & Co., 28 P. 2d 932, the 
decision states, page 936: 
"While the doctrine of last clear chance has 
been applied in certain exceptional cases involv-
ing collisions between moving vehicles, we are of 
the opinion that it should not be applied to the 
ordinary case in which the act creating the peril 
occurs practically simultaneously with the hap-
pening of the accident and in which neither party 
can fairly be said to have had a last clear chance 
thereafter to avoid the consequences. To apply 
the doctrine to such cases would be equivalent to 
denying the existence of the general rule which 
makes contributory negligence a bar to recovery.'' 
See also Delsman v. Bertotti, 93 P. 2d 371; Bullock 
v. Luke, supra; Martin v. Sheffield, 189 P. 2d 127; Buch-
hein v. Atchison, T. & 8. F. Ry. Co . ., 75 P. 2d 280; Anthony 
v. Costello Motor Co., 88 P. 2d 1025; Juergens v. Front, 
163 S. E. 618. 
It was also error to submit the instruction to the 
jury since the complaint fails to specify the facts which 
would invoke the operation of the doctrine. In Stitzell v. 
Arthur Morgan Trucking Co., 118 S. W. 2d 49, the court 
states: 
''Not alone was the form of the instruction on 
the humanitarian doctrine erroneous, but ... the 
petition wholly failed to state any cause of action 
against defendant Brown under that (humani-
tarian) rule for the reason th:at the .petition failed 
to allege that at any time or place plaintiff came 
into or was in a position of imminent peril and 
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that defendant Brown breached any duty owing 
by him to plaintiff under the hum:anitarian rule 
... The petition thus failing to state a cause of 
action under the humanitarian rule, no instruc-
tion, however correct in form, could have been 
given submitting the case against defendant 
Brown under the humanitarian rule.'' 
The instruction itself, moreover, is not a correct 
statement of the last clear chance doctrine. For example, 
it fails to cover one of the key points of the doctrine 
that the person who has negligently placed himself in a 
position of peril must be so situated that he cannot by his 
own efforts extricate himself or prevent t~e inevitable 
injury. The instruction simply deals with the position of 
peril, and relieves the plaintiff from all further responsi-
bility once that position is reached. The authorities defin-
ing the rule are clearly to the contrary. 
Errors No. 14 and 15 
These errors are directed to the trial court's Instruc-
tion No. 25, and to paragraph 3 thereof. There, the jury 
is charged as follows (R. 178) : 
No. 25 
You are instructed further that it is the duty 
of a driver of a motor vehicle upon and along 
the public highways of this State to at all times 
exercise due care and diligence in the driving of 
the same. 
In this connection, you are instructed that it 
was the duty of the driver of the trailer-truck, 
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Preston L. Norton, to constantly keep a proper 
lookout as he travelled along on said U. S. High-
way 91, and particularly as he was about to enter 
the intersection in question on entering Provo 
City, and to keep his truck-trailer under proper 
control, having due regard for traffic crossing 
the Highway at 12th North on 5th West, or for 
any other condition which may produce a hazard 
or accident; and to drive said truck-trailer at 
such time and .place so as to have the same under 
proper control, having regard not only to the 
speed of said truck, but also as to the weight of 
said truck-trailer; of the load that he was carry-
ing, as well as ability to stop, and to use ordinary 
care and diligence so as to prevent accidents and 
collisions. 
And if you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the defendant Norton, in so driv-
ing along the Highway US 91, did not keep a 
proper lookout at such time and place; or failed 
or neglected to exercise reasonable care and dili-
gence at said time and place, with regard to the 
above named conditions, and that such careless-
ness and negligence was the proximate cause of 
the accident and resulting death of the deceased; 
and you further find that the deceased was not 
guilty of contributory negligence, as explained 
to you in these Instructions, then your verdict 
should be for the plaintiffs and against the de-
fendants, and you should assess damages as you 
may determine, from the evidence, is just and 
equitable. 
The net effect of this instruction is to submit to the 
jury the negligence of defendant Norton in not keeping 
a proper lookout as he approached and entered the inter-
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section. As has been pointed out heretofore, there is no 
evidence to support this submission of this ground of 
negligence to the jury, and it should not have been so 
submitted. The evidence shows clearly that the defendant 
saw the deceased as he was driving between the stop sign 
on the northeast corner and the easterly edge of the 
intersection, and that he thereafter continued to clearly 
observe him during the entire traverse of the intersection. 
And there is not one word in the evidence to the contrary. 
If the defendant was negligent, which we deny, that 
negligence most certainly did not consist of failing to 
keep a ·proper lookout, and the jury should not have been 
allowed to speculate upon this ground. 
Apparently a second ground of negligence submitted 
to the jury by this instruction is that the defendant 
''failed or neglected to exercise reasonable care and 
diligence.'' This is, in net effect, a charge to the jury 
that they may find defendant guilty of negligence upon 
any ground which might enter their minds, and which 
amounted to failure to exercise reasonable care and dili-
gence. Where, as here, the com·plaint specifically alleges 
the grounds of negligence upon which the action is to be 
tried, the jury's deliberations should be confined to those 
acts specifically enumerated which have been proved by 
the evidence. If the case can be submitted in this manner 
after such pleading, there is little point or purpose in 
the pleadings themselves. 
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Error No. 16 
Error No. 16 is directed to the trial court's refusal 
to instruct the jury in accordance with defendants' Re-
quest No. 5 (R. 144). That request reads as follows: 
No.5 
You are instructed that in the exercise of due 
care, a person who is using or about to use a 
public highway is required to make reasonable 
use of his senses and intelligence to observe and 
discover impending danger and to see what is in 
plain sight upon the highway and to hear a 
warning which is clearly audible. 
In this case, the evidence shows without dis-
pute that immediately to the north of the center 
of the intersection at which the accident occurred, 
there was located a neutral zone or safety island 
twenty-two and one-half feet wide and that there 
was adequate room in the intersection immediate-
ly south of this zone for deceased to have stopped 
his automobile and protected himself against 
south-bound traffic. And if you find from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that at the time the 
automobile driven by deceased approached the 
area in said intersection south of said safety zone, 
the truck driven by defendant Preston Norton 
was in plain view upon the highway, and that the 
deceased knew, or in the exercise of reasonable 
care should have known, that by his continuing 
across the intersection at that time a collision 
might result between said truck and said automo-
bile, and if you further find that the driver of 
an automobile, in the exercise of reasonable care 
under like circumstances, could have stopped his 
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automobile within the area south of said safety 
zone, or before reaching the lane of travel of said 
truck, and avoided the collision, then you are in-
structed that the failure on the part of the de-
ceased to stop constituted negligence, and if you 
also find that said negligence proximately con-
tributed to said collision, then you should return 
a verdict in favor of the defendant and against 
the plaintiffs, no cause of action. 
This request may be said to constitute the defend-
ant's theory of the case, and is in effect a summary of the 
applicable rules of law to be applied to the conduct of 
the deceased in driving his ~r across the intersection. 
Not only did the trial court fail to clearly or adequately 
present this theory, which follows the theory of law 
advanced in the cases cited in this brief in connection 
with the argument on Error No. 1, but has also instructed 
the jury in a manner which negatives the essential por-
tions of this instruction. An example may be found in the 
courts Instructions Nos. 6 and 8 which have been previ-
ously discussed under the arguments on Errors 5 and 6, 
and 7 and8. 
The necessity of submitting the case to the jury 
upon a proper theory of the defense of a defendant, as 
well as the theory of the plaintiff, would seem so well 
established as not to require extensive citation. As the 
court stated in Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124 
Pac. 522, at page 124: 
''Because the matter was not submitted to the 
jury 'under proper instructions', and on the 
theory of the defendant, is what gives rise to the 
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defendant's complaint. There are two parties to 
a lawsuit. Each, on a submission of the case to a 
jury, is entitled to a submission of it on his theory 
and the law in respect thereof. The defendant's 
theory as to the c:ause of the accident is embodied 
in the proposed requests. There is some evidence, 
as we have shown, to render them applicable to 
the case. That is not disputed. We think the 
court's refusal to charge substantially as re-
quested was error. That the ruling was preju-
dicial and works a reversal of the judgment is 
self-evident and unavoidable.'' 
See also Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435, 132 P. 2d 114, 
120. 
Error No. 17 
This error is directed to the trial court's failure to 
instruct the jury in accordance with defendant's Request 
No. 7. That request reads as follows (R. 7): 
No.7 
You may ask yourselves the question: When 
has a vehicle on a through highway approached 
too close to an intersection as to constitute an 
immediate hazard~ The answer is that the ap-
rp·roaching vehicle is that close whenever, if a 
reasonably prudent person were in the position 
of the driver who has stopped his automobile at 
the entrance to the through highway, he would 
apprehend the probability of colliding with the 
approaching vehicle were he then to enter the 
highway. 
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This request defines the point at which an automobile 
proceeding on an arterial highway is approaching so 
close to an intersection as to constitute an immediate 
hazard to another car attempting to cross, after stopping 
at a stop sign, at right angles to the arterial highway. 
A definition of an immediate hazard most certainly would 
seem essential if the jury is to be adequately advised on 
a crossing accident of this kind. The court, in Instruction 
~ o. 6, and again in Instruction No. 11, advises the jury, 
or attempts to advise the jury, as to the effect of pro-
ceeding across the intersection upon the existence of an 
immediate hazard, but neither of these instru~tions, nor 
any other instruction actually given, adequately defines 
the factual situation which will create the immediate 
hazard. 
Errors No. 18, No. 19 and No. 20 
Errors No. 18, No. 19 and No. 20 are directed to the 
trial court's refusal to instruct the jury in accordance 
with defendant's Requests No. 13, No. 14 and No. 15. 
The purpose of these three requests is to specifically re-
move from the jury's consideration the negligent acts of 
defendant, as charged in the complaint, of failing to 
apply his brakes, failing to keep a careful lookout, and 
failure to have the truck under proper control. The re-
quests read as follows: 
No.13 
You are instructed that the evidence in this 
case shows without dispute that the defendant, 
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Preston Norton, at the time of the accident, in 
approaching and 'passing over the intersection 
involved in this case, applied the brakes of the 
truck which he was then and there operating, and 
in arriving at your verdict you should eliminate 
from consideration the charge of negligence made 
by plaintiffs that said defendant, Preston Nor-
ton, failed to apply the brakes of said truck. 
No. 14 
You are instructed that there is no evidence 
to show that the defendant, Preston Norton, in 
approaching and passing over the intersection 
involved in this accident, failed to keep a careful 
lookout; and in arriving at your verdict you 
should eliminate from consideration the charge of 
negligence made by plaintiffs, that said driver of 
defendants' truck in approaching and passing 
through said intersection failed to keep a proper 
lookout. 
No. 15 
If you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant, Preston Norton, at the 
time and place of the collision or the accident 
involved in this case, had the truck and trailer 
under control, the Court instructs you that in 
arriving at your verdict you should eliminate 
from consideration the charge of negligence made 
by plaintiffs, that the defendant, Preston Norton, 
failed to keep said truck and trailer under control. 
The basic difficulty again centers around the failure 
of the court to in any way limit or define the grounds of 
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negligence which the jury could consider, and upon which 
evidence had been introduced. lls has heretofore been 
indicated, the evidence as to lookout is certainly clearly 
to the effect that Norton saw the deceased's car prior to 
its entering the intersection, and that he continued to 
see it at all times across the intersection to impact. So 
far as the failure to apply brakes is concerned, the evi-
dence is clearly to the effect that the brakes were applied 
immediately upon the creation of danger when deceased 
left the safety zone. So far as the failure to keep the 
truck under proper control, the evidence is also clearly 
to the effect that the defendant had the truck under con-
trol at all times and that he actually, in the exercise of 
that control, veered to the west in an attempt to avoid 
the collision. lls to all three of these matters, we believe 
the controlling factor is that up to the time it became 
apparent that the deceased was going to pass the center 
of the street, there was no occasion to take any definite 
positive action, so far as the defendant was concerned, 
and that prior to this time, and while deceased was cross-
ing the easterly one-half of the highway, the defendant 
was entitled to assume that the stop at the inters·ection 
center would be made. 
It was prejudicial error to permit the jury to specu-
late on these grounds of negligence. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the trial court 
erred in failing to grant the defendants' motions for a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
70 
nonsuit and directed verdict, and that in the actual trial 
of the case the trial court committed prejudicial error in 
many of its instructions and in failing to submit to the 
jury many of the defendants' requested instructions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, THURMAN and WORSLEY, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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